




Moral Appraisal for Everyone: 
Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons 
 
Abstract 
De Re Significance accounts of moral appraisal consider an agent’s 
responsiveness to a particular kind of reason, normative moral reasons de re, 
to be of central significance for moral appraisal. Here, I argue that such 
accounts find it difficult to accommodate some neuroatypical agents. I offer 
an alternative account of how an agent’s responsiveness to normative moral 
reasons affects moral appraisal – the Reasonable Expectations Account. 
According to this account, what is significant for appraisal is not the content 
of the reasons an agent is responsive to (de re or de dicto), but rather whether 
she is responsive to the reasons it is reasonable to expect her to be responsive 
to, irrespective of their content. I argue that this account does a better job of 
dealing with neuroatypical agents, while agreeing with the De Re 
Significance accounts on more ordinary cases.  
Keywords: Moral appraisal; blameworthiness; neuroatypicality; reasons; excuse; moral 
ignorance. 
I make trouble for accounts of moral appraisal that understand a particular kind of moral 
reason, normative moral reasons de re, to be particularly significant for moral appraisal. I 
show how these accounts are unable to satisfactorily accommodate cases involving 
neuroatypical agents, and I offer an alternative account, the Reasonable Expectations 
Account, that avoids placing any particular weight on which normative moral reasons agents 
are expected to respond to. I show how this does a better job of accommodating cases 
involving neuroatypical agents while agreeing with De Re Significance accounts on the cases 
they get right.  
1. Normative Moral Reasons De Re   
Normative moral reasons de re are the features of a situation that make actions morally right 




moral reason that makes insulting people morally wrong. Normative moral reasons are to be 
distinguished from both motivating reasons – the reasons an agent is motivated by in acting, 
and explanatory reasons – the reasons that explain why an agent acted as she did. What, 
exactly, the normative moral reasons are depends on what, in fact, makes actions right or 
wrong. For example, if the correct first-order moral theory is utilitarianism, then the 
normative moral reasons are whatever contributes to happiness maximisation. If Kantianism 
is true instead, then the normative moral reasons are whatever contribute to treating others 
as ends in themselves1. Normative moral reasons de re are to be contrasted with normative 
moral reasons de dicto, which concern only moral valence. For example, that action X is 
morally wrong is a normative moral reason de dicto not to do it. Appropriate responsiveness 
to normative moral reasons de re is thought by some to be particularly significant for moral 
appraisal2. For example, Elizabeth Harman emphasises its importance for determining 
blameworthiness:  
An action is blameworthy just in case the action resulted from the agent’s 
caring inadequately about what is morally significant – where this is not a 
matter of de dicto caring about morality but de re caring about what is in fact 
morally significant (2011: 460)). 
And, Nomy Arpaly emphasises its importance for determining praiseworthiness: 
For an agent to be morally praiseworthy for doing the right 
thing is for her to have done the right thing for the relevant moral reasons—
 
1 Normative moral reasons de re have also been described as the “right-making features” (Johnson-
King 2019, 2), and the “good conceptualized in the way preferred by the correct normative theory” 
(Arpaly and Schroeder 2013, 177). 
2 See Alvarez & Littlejohn (forthcoming); Arpaly (2002); Arpaly & Schroeder (2013); Harman (2011); 
Harman (2015); Markovits (2010); Weatherson (2019). Responsiveness to normative moral reasons de 
re has also been thought significant for identifying morally good agents, for example: “[g]ood people 
care non-derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe of their children and friends, the well-being 
of their fellows, people getting what they deserve, justice, equality, and the like, not just one thing: 





that is, the reasons for which she acts are identical to the reasons for which 
the action is right. […] For an agent to be morally praiseworthy for her right 
action it is not sufficient that her action be motivated by a desire to do 
what is right (2002: 73-4). 
These accounts – De Re Significance accounts – hold that blame is always deserved when the 
agent fails to respond appropriately to normative moral reasons de re, and praise is deserved 
only if the agent responds appropriately to normative moral reasons de re. In other words, 
responsiveness to normative moral reasons de re is central to determining moral appraisal3.   
De Re Significance Claim: Moral appraisal is determined entirely by the 
agent’s responsiveness to normative moral reasons de re. 
The model of appraisal that typically underpins De Re Significance accounts makes three 
core claims:  
1. Moral appraisal is determined by the quality of the agent’s will.   
2. Quality of will is deficient when the agent is insufficiently responsive to 
normative moral reasons.   
3. Normative moral reasons are always de re and never de dicto.   
In short, agents are blameworthy when and to the extent that they exhibit deficient quality 
of will, and agents who are unresponsive to normative moral reasons de re are thought to 
manifest deficient quality of will4. Here, I argue that De Re Significance accounts are mistaken 
because not every case in which an agent fails to respond to a normative moral reason de re 
should be viewed as a case in which the agent exhibits deficient quality of will. 
The De Re Significance Claim is often used as part of an explanation of why moral ignorance 
cannot excuse wrong action. Moral ignorance that leads to wrong action has been thought 
 
3 I use the term ‘responsiveness’ to capture various different ways of reacting to and interacting with 
normative moral reasons de re. While the quotations from Harman and Arpaly do not mention 
responsiveness, I intend “responsiveness” to capture the different terms they use to describe these 
reactions and interactions.  




necessarily incompatible with appropriate responsiveness to normative moral reasons de re 
and so unable to mitigate an agent’s blameworthiness for that wrong action5. According to 
De Re Significance accounts, agents who fail to be appropriately responsive to normative 
moral reasons de re are always blameworthy – regardless of their epistemic situation. One 
important result of the discussion will be that we have reason to resist this strong claim about 
moral ignorance.  
The following section discusses some cases that are particularly difficult for De Re 
Significance accounts to deal with. Section 3 discusses the strategies for dealing with these 
cases that are available to proponents of De Re Significance accounts and argues that they 
are unsuccessful. Section 4 adapts these cases so as to put further pressure on the idea that 
failing to be appropriately responsive to normative moral reasons de re always indicates 
deficient quality of will. Section 5 presents an alternative account of moral appraisal – the 
Reasonable Expectations Account – that does a better job of dealing with these cases, while 
agreeing with De Re Significance accounts on the more ordinary cases they get right. On this 
account, what is significant for appraisal is responsiveness to normative moral reasons that 
it is reasonable to expect the agent to recognise. This allows moral ignorance to excuse in some 
cases.  
 
2. Moral Limitations 
This section discusses cases of agents who are unresponsive to the normative moral reasons 
de re of their situation because their epistemic circumstances make it very difficult for them 
to be appropriately responsive. These cases present a problem for De Re Significance 
accounts of moral appraisal. On the one hand they seem committed to saying that these 
 
5 I use the term ‘moral ignorance’ fairly broadly, to include lack of belief or false belief about what is 
the morally right thing to do (for more on this, see Peels (2016)). I do not include true belief that falls 
short of knowledge within ‘ignorance’. In additional to thinking that moral ignorance cannot excuse, 
some have thought it is itself blameworthy (see Harman (2011, 2015); Mason (2015), Moody-Adams 




agents are blameworthy because they fail to be appropriately responsive to normative moral 
reasons de re. On the other hand, the agent’s epistemic circumstances make it doubtful 
whether these cases should be interpreted as cases of deficient quality of will.  
To illustrate the shape of the examples, here is a non-moral example. My capacity for culinary 
excellence is, sadly, limited. One explanation for this is that I am not sufficiently responsive 
to what is gastronomically important – normative gastronomical reasons de re. This makes 
me bad at cooking. Suppose, as many people think, that one should add salt when cooking 
pasta. If this is true, there will be reasons for this. Perhaps, “that it improves the texture of 
the pasta”, or “that it improves the taste of the pasta”. Whatever these reasons are, I am not 
sufficiently responsive to them. I have never been able to discern the difference between 
pasta cooked with added salt and pasta cooked without it. I also know that I am no expert – 
I assume there is some reason to add salt to pasta, and I know I fail to appreciate it. 
Nevertheless, it is possible for me to cook well, or well enough, without ever properly 
appreciating the reasons there are in favour of adding salt. When the gastronomical stakes 
are high – for example, when I am cooking for others – I know not to rely on my own culinary 
abilities. I use recipe books, or ask for advice. Given what I know about my own limitations, 
it seems that this is exactly what I should do – defer to culinary testimony, and not risk 
relying on my own flawed understanding of what is gastronomically important. 
Nevertheless, recipe books sometimes contains misprints. If my recipe contains a misprint, 
and I fail to add salt because of this, I do the wrong thing but – perhaps – do not deserve 
blame. The cases I discuss are structurally similar, but the relevant reasons are moral rather 
than culinary.  
This section focuses on fleshing out possible examples of agents whose position with respect 
to moral reasons is similar to mine with respect to culinary reasons and shows how De Re 
Significance accounts will find these difficult to deal with. I focus on cases involving autism 
and psychopathy. These are the most widely discussed by philosophers, and the 
neuroatypicalities most obviously relevant to the capacity to appreciate moral reasons. 




psychological features that ground limitations in appreciating moral reasons. Section 3 pre-
empts some strategies that De Re Significance accounts might use to deal with these cases, 
arguing that these will not be successful. Section 4 goes on to argue that these accounts face 
further problems when appraising agents like this who defer to moral testimony but do the 
wrong thing because that testimony turns out to be misleading – just as I might fail to add 
salt because my recipe contains a misprint.  
2.1 Autistic Agents  
The first case discusses epistemic limitations in responding to normative moral reasons de re.  
Truthfulness. Mike is autistic, and this makes it difficult for him to imagine 
the internal mental lives of other people, including the more complex aspects 
of how others will feel in response to his actions. Since he finds other people’s 
emotions difficult to imagine, he also finds it difficult to see them as reasons 
for and against actions. Mike desires the well-being of others, and he believes 
that others’ well-being is always served by their knowing the truth. 
Sometimes people’s feelings are hurt when he is too truthful, but he finds it 
difficult to predict such occurrences. He usually only notices that he has ‘put 
his foot in it’ when his friends and family explain to him why that person 
was upset, and tell him that he must try to be more sensitive. Moreover, 
explanations of why these people are upset strike him as confusing and a 
little far-fetched. While he tries to be charitable, he struggles to believe that 
it could really be so morally important to avoid hurtful assertions, 
particularly when this comes at the expense of saying things that are relevant 
and true.  
Autism is characterised by impaired social interaction, deficits in empathy, and impaired 
understanding of other people6. These all contribute to difficulties in understanding the 
social world, including aspects of the social world that are morally significant. Mike’s autism 
thus makes him prone to failing to be appropriately responsive to some normative moral 
reasons de re, as in Truthfulness. Assuming that, ceteris paribus, ‘that someone’s feelings 
would be hurt’ is a normative moral reason de re to avoid doing that which would cause hurt 
 





feelings, Mike systematically fails to be appropriately responsive to this. Not only is Mike 
unable to reliably recognize hurt feelings, he is sceptical of the importance of avoiding 
hurting feelings in some cases.  
Of course, just as I can use a recipe book when cooking, Mike has strategies available to him 
that can help him understand other people well enough to avoid hurting them. For example, 
he can ask people he trusts, or spend time learning different facial cues. However, while these 
strategies will help to some extent, they are unlikely to be as effective as the resources for 
social understanding available to neurotypical people. When he inevitably slips up, this does 
not indicate deficient quality of will. The problem for De Re Significance accounts is that they 
cannot accommodate this. In so far as he fails to be appropriately responsive to the normative 
moral reasons de re against asserting hurtful truths, De Re Significance accounts are forced to 
say that Mike is blameworthy.  
There are two ways De Re Significance accounts might attempt to avoid this implication. 
First, they might respond that the features of the situation that Mike’s autism causes him to 
miss are mere details, and not among what is morally important (de re). Provided he cares 
about more general morally important things, such as the well-being in others in general, 
then De Re Significance accounts need not say think that he has deficient quality of will, and 
can avoid saying he is blameworthy. This is what Arpaly and Schroeder (2013) suggest. They 
claim that there is no conflict between their account of moral appraisal and neuroatypical 
psychology, saying, “there are times when the virtuous person fails to feel the right emotions, 
think the right thoughts, or attend to the right things. […] autism, absent-mindedness, and 
the like are all morally neutral. Even a perfectly virtuous person can be mentally retarded, 
manic, depressed, autistic, or absent-minded.” (2013, 201). They take the view that quality of 
will is determined entirely by the agent’s desires – whether they intrinsically desire the good, 
correctly conceptualized. Provided Mike has the right desires, he need not be blameworthy.  
This approach is plausible in some cases. For example, compare the following case, in which 




Distraction. Steve is trying to decide how to allocate office space. The 
available space is such that not everyone can have an ideal office. Various 
considerations contribute to determining the fair allocation of the available 
office space (how much each researcher uses the office, their accessibility 
needs, etc.). Working out the fairest allocation is complicated, and to help 
him, Steve has taken detailed notes of these various considerations. Part way 
through the allocation process, Steve is distracted by a bird crashing into his 
window. This causes him to miss a line in his notes, meaning that some of 
the researchers’ needs are not factored into the allocation fairly, and those 
researchers are much worse off than the others.  
De Re Significance accounts should not want to say that Steve is blameworthy. Assuming he 
has taken appropriate precautions against becoming distracted, it seems incorrect to attribute 
deficient quality of will to him. So, De Re Significance accounts must find some way of 
denying that Steve is unresponsive to the normative reasons of the situation. To this end, 
they might argue that the details he misses are not, in fact, among the normative moral 
reasons de re. Perhaps the normative moral reasons de re include only more general things 
such as fairness in general. Steve then need not be blameworthy so long as he is appropriately 
responsive to these. Alternatively, perhaps the details are among what is morally important 
(de re), and Steve is appropriately responsive to them in virtue of, for example, writing them 
down, and aiming to take them into consideration. Perhaps it is also relevant that he would 
have responded appropriately to these considerations had he not become distracted7.  
Assuming that De Re Significance accounts have the resources to accommodate cases like 
this, we might think that agents like Mike can be accommodated similarly. However, it is not 
clear that they can.  Unlike Steve, Mike does not quite have the right desires. For example, he 
does not desire that he avoid asserting hurtful truths – he is sceptical of the importance of 
this. Furthermore, some aspects of the situation that he is not sufficiently responsive to are 
not mere details – they are morally significant. Being appropriately responsive to the 
consideration ‘that it would hurt someone’s feelings’, requires direct responsiveness to the 
 
7 Compare Weatherson’s discussion of how practical irrationality can sometimes explain how an 
agent is blameless in virtue of having the right concerns despite not doing what those concerns 




moral badness of hurting other peoples’ feelings. Proponents of De Re Significance accounts 
emphasise the importance of this intrinsic concern for normative moral reasons de re. 
However, in some situations Mike is oblivious to the moral badness of hurting other people’s 
feelings. Mike is not responding to the right reasons if he only avoids saying the hurtful thing 
in response to some other, more general consideration. If indirect responses to more general 
reasons could also count as appropriate responses to normative moral reasons de re, this 
would put pressure on the significance of normative reasons de re, and thus on the central 
project of De Re Significance accounts.  
Another way that De Re Significance accounts might attempt to deal with agents like Mike 
is by denying that they are appropriate targets of moral appraisal. Some have thought that 
full moral agency requires a degree of emotional empathy, and resulting ability to enter into 
another’s perspective, something that autistic people characteristicaly lack (Blair 1995; 
Hobson 2007; Shoemaker 2015, 168)8. Others have seen moral agency as requiring the ability 
to participate in a moral conversations involving the exchange of moral reasons9 – which 
according to De Re Significance accounts would have to be de re and not de dicto.  De Re 
Significance accounts might on these grounds argue that autism precludes full moral agency. 
However, autistic people often seem very able to participate in moral life by making choices, 
deliberating, and adopting moral rules. Temple Grandin, well-known both for her autism 
and her work on humane cattle slaughterhouses, is clearly guided by a deep moral 
commitment to improving animal welfare10, and so seems to possess the necessary abilities 
to participate in ordinary moral life. In support of this, Krahn and Fenton (2009) argue that 
high-functioning autistic people have the capacity for cognitive (but not emotional) empathy, 
 
8 Emotional empathy is to be distinguished from cognitive or evaluative empathy – the ability to 
recognise other people’s emotions using facial cues or other information. The latter can be learned 
and is not in principle beyond autistic people (Blair 1996; Kennett 2002; Krahn and Fenton 2009).  
9 For articulations of this account, see Stern (1974); Watson (1993); Wallace (1994); Wolf (1994); Fischer 
and Ravizza (1999); Darwall (2006). 
10 See, for example, (Grandin and Johnson, 2005), as well as her website, on which one finds statements 





and this is sufficient for moral agency, and Shoemaker (2007) argues that autistic lack of 
empathy need not imply a lack of caring about other people, and it is this (rather than 
emotional empathy) that is needed for full participation in moral practices11.  
Taking a slightly different approach, Kennett (2002) argues that empathy (cognitive or 
emotional) is not a necessary condition of moral agency, but merely one method to discover 
information about the moral landscape. It is primarily an epistemic tool. This implies that 
autistic people need not be thought to have their moral agency compromised, so long as they 
can find alternative methods to discover the relevant information – for example, relying on 
testimony, or studying moral rules and theories12. While autistic people may lack the 
emotional resources to understand other people as well or as quickly as neurotypical people, 
they face no particular barriers to using these other methods.  
If this this is right, then we should not think of the limitations involved in autism as putting 
agents beyond moral evaluation. However, the alternative methods that autistic people are 
able to make use of will not always be as effective epistemic routes to the relevant moral 
information as ordinary neurotypical empathy. It is implausible that relying on these routes 
will never cause autistic agents to fail to appreciate moral reasons – Mike’s case is one example 
of this13. So long as it is possible that some of the information that these alternative routes 
miss is more than mere details, autistic agents will sometimes face an impaired ability to be 
appropriately responsive to the normative moral reasons de re. Lack of responsiveness to 
normative moral reasons de re in these circumstances does not seem to be a manifestation of 
deficient quality of will, but rather a different – neuroatypical – way of approaching the 
world.  
 
11 He later backpeddles on this claim, arguing in later work that autistic deficits in (emotional) 
empathy do preclude full moral agency in the sense of accountability (Shoemaker 2015, 168).  
12 Kennett mentions “Kantian” motivation as one of these alternatives to empathy, which would 
suggest motivation by moral reasons de dicto, putting her view in opposition to De Re Significance 
accounts.    
13 Stout (2016), who sees autism as primarily a deficit in counterfactual reasoning, also argues that the 
necessity of relying on methods that do not employ counterfactual reasoning will sometimes lead to 




In other words, and as Kennett puts it, “there is more than one way to be a moral agent” 
(2002: 357). It would be a problem for De Re Significance accounts if it turned out that they 
are forced to treat behaviour that is merely neuroatypical as if it were blameworthy. De Re 
Significance accounts risk doing this because they insist that to avoid blame, the agent must 
be responsive to a particular set of considerations (the normative moral reasons de re). So long 
as there are possible neuroatypicalities that prevent proper appreciation of this set of 
considerations, these neuroatypicalities will be difficult for De Re Significance accounts to 
accommodate. They will be forced to say that agents who fail to respond appropriately to 
these considerations are either blameworthy or less-than-full moral agents.  
2.2 Psychopaths 
Psychopaths present another kind of neuroatypicality that De Re Significance accounts find 
it difficult to deal with.  
Distinction. Bonnie consistently fails to appreciate the distinction between 
moral and conventional wrongs. She has managed to learn by heart most of 
the actions typically considered wrong, either morally or conventionally, 
and has found that avoiding these actions is usually a good idea (for 
example, it avoids unpleasant confrontations with the law). She knows that 
some of these actions are considered ‘morally’ wrong, and therefore more 
important to avoid than the others, but she is unable to feel the force of the 
distinction herself. One day, she is waiting for a taxi in the rain when a 
pregnant woman arrives at the taxi rank, urgently needing a taxi to take her 
to the hospital. While most neurotypical people would feel morally 
compelled to offer the first taxi to the pregnant woman, this does not occur 
to Bonnie. The situation does not fall under the description of any of the 
actions that she has learned are wrong, either morally or conventionally. 
Bonnie takes the first taxi when it arrives, and does not allow the pregnant 
woman to go first14. 
 
14 Bonnie, as a character, is due to Rosen (2002, 76). He implausibly attributes her lack of capacity to 




Psychopaths characteristically fail to appreciate the distinction between ‘moral’ and 
‘conventional’ norms15. Some have taken this to imply that psychopaths lack crucial 
competencies relevant to morality. They are unable to “grasp moral concepts”, and they lack 
“sensitivity” to moral harms and wrongings (Levy 2007: 166)16. These limitations would seem 
to preclude psychopaths from being appropriately responsive to normative moral reasons de 
re. Bonnie is unable to appreciate the moral reasons to let the pregnant woman have the taxi, 
because she is unable to appreciate the moral significance of considerations such as the 
woman’s suffering, or the value of alleviating it.  
How should De Re Significance accounts deal with this case? On the one hand, since Bonnie 
is unresponsive to normative moral reasons de re, De Re Significance accounts seem 
committed to evaluating her as blameworthy. Indeed, many proponents of De Re 
Significance accounts have thought that psychopathic indifference towards moral 
considerations is paradigmatic of what it is to exhibit a negative quality of will, and is a 
manifestation of deficient quality of will no matter the circumstances (Scanlon (1998: 284); 
Arpaly (2002); Watson (2004: 266); Harman (2015); Mason (2015); Weatherson (2019)). The 
problem, they hold, is that Bonnie does not care enough about what is important. Bonnie 
manifests deficient quality of will because failing to respond appropriately to normative 
moral reasons de re always constitutes deficient quality of will. 
However, an important feature of this case is that the moral transgression Bonnie commits is 
relatively subtle. Unlike other, more egregious moral transgressions, failing to offer taxis to 
pregnant women is not prohibited by law, and there is no one else around offering their 
 
15 In contrast, autistic people typically can make this distinction (Blair 1996). Some have attributed 
this difference to a distinction between ‘cognitive’ and ‘affective’ defects in empathy (psychopaths 
possess the former and lack the latter, while autism involves only a lack of the former (Krahn and 
Fenton 2009, 145). 
16 Others have disputed whether the empirical data on the moral/conventional distinction really 
supports Levy’s claim that psychopaths lack moral knowledge or understanding (Vargas and Nichols 
2007). Since my interest is in the more general question of how the possibility of epistemic failings 
like these should affect the putative moral significance of normative moral reasons de re, I leave this 
dispute aside. For more on psychopaths and moral reasoning, see Cleckley (1955); Blair et al. (2005); 




judgments on Bonnie’s actions. She does not have much information about the normative 
features of the case – she is unable to appreciate the salient moral reasons for herself, and she 
has very little other input. Compare the following case:  
Murder. Bonnie is waiting in the rain, under an umbrella, for a taxi at a 
currently empty taxi rank. She is in no particular hurry. Soon she is joined 
by pregnant woman who needs to get to the hospital as soon as possible. To 
lessen the boredom of the wait, she decides to murder the pregnant woman 
and hide her body before the first taxi arrives.  
Murder is a striking and obvious example of something typically thought to be morally 
wrong. Most legal systems prohibit it, and even the most basic knowledge of society’s 
conventions indicate that it is thought to be wrong. One does not need to appreciate the 
distinctions between moral and conventional prohibitions to work out that murder is thought 
by most to be wrong, and if they are right, then it is very wrong. Just as I can use a recipe 
book when cooking, Bonnie can use information about legal or conventional prohibitions to 
avoid actions that might be wrong17. It would be more plausible that she was blameworthy 
in a case like this. 
Having presented the cases under discussion, the following section pre-empts some 
strategies that De Re Significance accounts might use to deal with these cases. 
 
3. Possible Responses to the Cases 
Of course, it is open to proponents of De Re Significance accounts to simply accept these 
implausible verdicts about blameworthiness and claim that any intuitive resistance we might 
have to them is mistaken. Indeed, some have done exactly this. Arpaly and Schroeder 
 
17 As others have argued, psychopaths can perhaps be held responsible for failing to follow 
conventional norms, given that they know that many of these are also moral norms – the idea being 
that it is blameworthy to disregard conventional norms without good reason (Vargas and Nichols 
2007; Blair 2008; Greenspan 2016). However, as Levy points out (2007), there are problems with this 
as a solution – we do not normally think there is anything morally significant about disregarding 
merely conventional norms. In Section 5 I elaborate further on why we should expect psychopaths to 




emphasise that although agents with autism (or other psychological limitations) face no 
barrier to being praiseworthy – provided they are responsive to what is in fact morally 
important (2013, 201). Arpaly and Schroeder do not entertain the idea that autism might 
make appropriate responsiveness to salient moral considerations very difficult. However, 
elsewhere they make clear that in so far as an agent fails to be appropriately responsive to 
what is morally important, she is blameworthy – even if it is not her fault she is unresponsive 
(2013, 186). So, it seems we are forced to conclude that although autistic agents can in 
principle be appropriately responsive, if they are not, the difficulties they face afford them 
no excuse. I do not have much to say in response to this, other than that it seems implausible. 
While my opponents will not be persuaded by this, it is helpful to highlight the implications 
of De Re Significance accounts for those who might want to adopt them. Section 4 goes on to 
argue that there are additional and hitherto unanticipated implausible implications of these 
accounts when agents who face moral limitations try to use moral testimony to do the right 
thing.   
On the other hand, De Re Significance accounts might avoid making these claims about 
blameworthiness by responding that Bonnie is not an appropriate target of blame, because 
she is not a fully responsible moral agent. As Levy puts it, “psychopaths do not possess the 
relevant moral knowledge for distinctively moral responsibility; lacking this knowledge, they 
are unable to control their actions in the light of moral reasons.” (2007, 129). Similarly, 
Shoemaker argues that psychopaths are ‘marginal’ agents because they lack sufficient regard 
for others (2015).   
However, there is a sense in which neither of these seems like the right response. The 
psychopath’s limitations are structurally similar to Mike’s (and to some extent Steve’s) 
limitations, so we might expect similar treatment. All three are cut off from some morally 
relevant aspects of their environment, and all three seem to possess sufficient agency to 
manage their actions (and so do not seem beyond moral appraisal entirely). If we were 
reluctant to blame Mike, we should also be reluctant to blame Bonnie. And, if we think that 




should also think that Mike’s put him beyond moral assessment. Like Mike, she fails to weigh 
the importance of moral considerations correctly. Bonnie does not think that moral 
considerations are more important than her conventional wrongs, and Mike does not think 
that hurt feelings are more important than truth-telling. The difference between them is that 
Bonnie’s failures are more general. Furthermore, psychopaths are in many respects 
ordinarily responsible agents. They make decisions for reasons, act freely, and understand 
conventional and legal rules against various wrong actions. Some have thought this is 
enough (Vargas and Nichols 2007; Blair 2008; Greenspan 2016)18. This route is not open to De 
Re Significance accounts – for them, it is only responsiveness to normative moral reasons de 
re that is relevant in moral assessment. So, unless there are moral reasons to obey 
conventional norms, psychopaths cannot be blameworthy for disobeying conventional 
norms. So, De Re Significance accounts must either say that psychopaths are exempt from 
moral assessment, or that they are blameworthy for disregarding the normative moral 
reasons de re.  
Viewing Bonnie (and perhaps other neuroatypical agents) as possessing less-than-full moral 
agency is problematic for a further reason – it is at odds with our usual approaches to 
limitations in competence. It means banishing many neuroatypical individuals from the 
moral community. Compare our approaches to physical limitations, for which it is usually 
considered appropriate to accommodate within the community, rather than banish 
individuals from it. We typically expect wheelchair ramps to be provided to allow 
individuals to access public buildings and participate in the moral and social practices that 
take place there. Were we to, instead of doing this, take something like Strawson’s (1962) 
‘objective stance’ towards wheelchair users and simply exclude them from these practices, 
this would not be thought acceptable.  
 
18 The idea being that it is blameworthy to disregard conventional norms without good reason. As 
Levy points out (2007), there are problems with this as a solution – we do not normally think there is 




Not only this but exempting neuroatypical people from the demands of morality by taking 
the objective stance towards them depends on the possibility of drawing a clean line between 
neuroatypical agents and the rest of us. It is not obvious that this is possible. The 
psychological characteristics that contribute to moral competence reasoning plausibly come 
in degrees, and vary among the population. Even the most neurotypical of us will have found 
ourselves in morally unfamiliar situations in which our epistemic access to salient moral 
considerations is limited. For example, when travelling in an unfamiliar culture, or puzzled 
or mistaken about the correct first-order moral theory19. Neuroatypical agents can be thought 
of as extreme examples of these more everyday situations.  
The previous section showed that there are possible cases of unresponsiveness to normative 
moral reasons de re in which it is both appropriate to treat the agent as ordinarily responsible, 
and it is questionable whether the agent should be interpreted as manifesting deficient 
quality of will, because of the epistemic barriers they face to accessing to the normative moral 
reasons de re. De Re Significance accounts cannot easily accommodate these cases. As this 
section has argued, they are forced to either blame neuroatypical agents who fail to respond 
to normative moral reasons de re, thus dismissing the moral relevance of the psychological 
limitations these agents, or inappropriately view these agents as less-than-full moral agents. 
In Section 5 I will argue that responsiveness to normative moral reasons de re is not all that 
matters for moral appraisal, and propose an account that avoids having to endorse either of 
these unappealing options for dealing with neuroatypical agents.  
The following section shows how these cases present a particular challenge for De Re 
Significance accounts when agents with these limitations try to do the right thing by relying 
on testimony.  
 
19 Another example is uneven distribution of moral knowledge relevant to the wrongness of sexual 





4. Bad Advice  
This section argues that there are additional respects in which De Re Significance accounts 
are forced to make implausible claims about neuroatypical agents – once we develop the 
cases from the previous section into cases of acting wrongly on the basis of misleading 
testimony. I highlight how the agents’ epistemic situations are such that responding to the 
normative moral reasons de re of the situation is neither the only nor the best way for them 
to act well. If they are aware of this, and deliberately act in a way they have good reason to 
think will enable them to do the right thing, they deserve positive moral appraisal (that is, 
they at least deserve an excuse, and we might additionally think they deserve praise). In 
contrast to De Re Significance accounts, I argue that this is true even if they are only 
responsive to normative moral reasons de dicto. I argue that De Re Significance accounts are 
forced to evaluate neuroatypical agents who are trying to do the right thing as blameworthy, 
and this is a problem because these agents are not manifesting a deficient quality of will.  I 
argue that to accommodate these cases successfully, we should think that on some occasions, 
moral ignorance does excuse (pace De Re Significance accounts). 
These cases are constructed in the following way. An agent with a limitation in their capacity 
to be appropriately responsive to some relevant normative moral reasons de re faces a 
difficult moral choice. They also know that this is the sort of case in which they are prone to 
making the wrong choice. Preferring to do the right thing rather than the wrong thing, but 
remaining neutral on what that is, they seek out and act on moral advice. Unfortunately, the 
advice is misleading and they do the wrong thing. These cases are much like the example of 
the incompetent chef cooking pasta for others and following a recipe.  It is worth noting that 
acknowledging the moral commendability of this behaviour is consistent with the 
widespread claim that in general there is something morally non-ideal about deference to 
moral testimony. Philosophers have offered various ways of cashing out exactly what is 
wrong with deference to moral testimony. For example, that it undermines moral worth 




2007)20. Agreeing that there is something non-ideal about moral testimony need not preclude 
thinking that there are some situations in which one should defer and would be praiseworthy 
for doing so. For example, when the agent knows that her judgment is likely to be 
compromised (see Enoch (2014)). Here, I am claiming only that in some situations deference 
to moral testimony is the best option an agent has, and if this leads them to do something 
wrong, they should not be evaluated as blameworthy, because trying to do the right thing 
using the best available means you have does not constitute deficient quality of will.  
Indeed, it is plausible that this is exactly what you should do. Agents who have limited 
capacities for moral reasoning should avoid relying on their own abilities when they find 
themselves in high stakes moral situations – just as I should use a recipe book when cooking. 
In so far as they are aware of their limitations, they should make use of strategies to 
compensate for them – for example, seeking out reliable moral testimony. Since they should 
do this, it would be inappropriate to blame them. Even the wisest moral advisors are 
occasionally mistaken. When this happens, agents who relied on their advice will do the 
wrong thing. And, it seems correct to say that they acted out of moral ignorance – not 
knowing what the right thing to do is, they do whatever the advisor says is the right thing to 
do, because they believe it was the right thing to do, while ignorant of what the right thing 
actually is. However, if the above is correct, then they are not blameworthy because they 
were doing what they ought to do, and not manifesting deficient quality of will. So, this 
seems to be a case in which moral ignorance excuses.  
 
20 Other accounts include that: deference implies that the agent lacks sufficient moral understanding 
necessary for complete moral virtue (Hills 2009); there are no moral experts (Williams 1995; McGrath 
2009); that deference prevents authentic interaction (Skarsaune 2016), and that deference can only 
exhibit non-deficient quality of will if the advisors have the moral sensibilities that the agents would 
ordinarily have, if they were ideal. Deference can thus be seen as a way to defer to one’s “true self” 
(McGrath 2009, 323). However, on this last option, it is implausible that we should think of our true 
selves as morally ideal – this would implausibly paper over many psychological characteristics than 




However, De Re Significance accounts cannot agree with these positive claims about 
employing strategies to compensate for moral limitations, because the testimony that the 
agents would need would be of the following form:   
“Do X, because X is morally right.”21 
This testimony cites only the action’s moral value – that X is the right thing to do – as the 
reason to do X. This makes it a normative moral reason de dicto (and not de re).  Furthermore, 
we can assume that this is the only reason the agents are responsive to – we have stipulated 
that these are agents who lack the capacity to be responsive to the relevant normative moral 
reasons de re. This means that when the advice is misleading, the agents are blameworthy, 
and their attempts to do the right thing cannot redeem them. However, this seems like the 
wrong assessment. That X is morally right is a good reason for agents with limited moral 
abilities to do X, something for which they should be praised rather than blamed22. Indeed 
we might blame them for not following the advice.  
The problem is that the idea that moral appraisal depends entirely on responsiveness to 
normative moral reasons de re is plausible, at best, only for neurotypical agents. It is perhaps 
plausible that in ordinary cases, when an agent cares only about what is morally right, and 
does not care about any of the morally right things (de re), this is sufficient to show that she 
is manifesting deficient quality of will. However, consideration of neuroatypical agents 
reveals possible cases in which motivations to do what is morally right de dicto accompanied 
by unresponsiveness to what is morally right de re is not an instance of deficient quality of 
will. Consider the following ordinary case of wrongdoing: 
 
21 It might be contested that the testimony is in fact of the form ‘S says that X is morally right’. 
Nevertheless, unless the action would be made right merely by S’s saying it is right, the morally salient 
information that the testimony provides is the de dicto consideration that X is to be done because it is 
morally right. 
22 See Sliwa (2012) on this point. Further support for this can be found in the observation that moral 
motivation de dicto seems acceptable when the agent is changing her moral views, for example 
revising one’s view of whether it is morally required to give more to charity, or refrain from eating 
meat (Svavarsdottir 1999). Indeed, even some who otherwise deny the praiseworthiness of 




Scrooge. Scrooge is the CEO of a large company.  He had a pleasant childhood 
and a good education. He does not care about the well-being of others at all 
– he cares only about his own interests. However, he cares very much about 
his profit margins. His marketing team tells him that if he is seen to be doing 
what is morally right this will improve profits in the next quarter. So, he hires 
a team of ethicists who tell him that improving conditions for his 
overworked employees is the right thing to do. Aiming to do the morally 
right thing, whatever it is, he makes some changes that improve conditions.  
There is no particular barrier to Scrooge caring more about important moral considerations, 
for example, the welfare of his employees. Nevertheless, he does not care. His motivation to 
do the right thing is clearly self-serving and does not make up for this. De Re Significance 
accounts deliver the correct evaluation here – he is blameworthy. He is not sufficiently 
responsive to considerations that he should be more responsive to. However, it is plausible 
that the inference from Scrooge’s unresponsiveness to normative moral reasons de re, to his 
deficient quality of will, is cogent because he is failing to care about important considerations 
that he could easily care about.  
There are important differences between Scrooge and neuroatypical agents like Mike and 
Bonnie. Unlike Scrooge, when they seek out and act on misleading advice, they are doing the 
best thing that they could do, given their limited capacities. Doing one’s best is not correctly 
characterised as deficient quality of will. On the contrary, their desires and motivations seem 
to deserve praise – even if not maximal praise (see Hills (2009), Sliwa (2012)). If this is right 
then De Re Significance accounts cannot be right, even if we accept the model of moral 
appraisal that typically underpins them. 
It is worth noting that De Re Significance accounts do have some resources for 
accommodating non-blameworthy cases of moral advice taking. Harman (2015) and 
Weatherson (2014) divide moral advice taking into two categories. First, sometimes acting on 
moral advice taking is not blameworthy because the advice taker is factually ignorant, and 




should therefore defer to their judgment not out of the de dicto motivation to do the right 
thing, but as a way to take into consideration the non-normative facts that she is unaware of 
(and that ideally she would investigate before reaching a judgment). The second category 
includes all other cases of acting on moral advice. These, they argue, are blameworthy 
because they are objectionable cases of responsiveness (only) to moral reasons de dicto, and 
this can never excuse wrongdoing. However, the cases discussed here fit comfortably into 
neither category.  
Another way that De Re Significance accounts might seek to accommodate the cases is by 
agreeing that morally limited agents can blamelessly act on advice but denying that this 
could involve unresponsiveness to normative moral reasons de re. Instead, they might argue, 
agents who act on moral advice blamelessly would not seek out testimony about what the 
morally right thing (de dicto) to do is, but about what the normative moral reasons de re are. 
This advice would be of the following form:  
“Respond to consideration Y, because it is one of the normative moral 
reasons de re”.   
However, it is not clear that this kind of advice would be of much use to morally limited 
agents.  For this advice to be useful, the agent would need to be able to draw the right 
conclusions about what the relevant normative moral reasons de re require, but it is not clear 
that the agents under discussion could do this. To insist that blamelessness requires these 
agents to seek only advice in de re form, regardless of its usefulness, itself suggests a kind of 
fetishism for moral reasons de re that we should reject.  
What this suggests is that the central claims of De Re Significance accounts are true only of 
some, largely neurotypical, agents. It is only for these agents that we can infer from a lack of 
response to normative moral reasons de re to deficient quality of will. De Re Significance 
accounts are committed to saying implausible things about neuroatypical agents. In the 
following section I offer an alternative account of moral appraisal which overcomes this 
problem by making greater reference to the agent’s capacities to be responsive to particular 




5. Reasonable Expectations  
This section presents an alternative to De Re Significance accounts, according to which 
blameworthiness depends on whether the agent is responsive to the aspects of the situation 
that it is reasonable to expect her to be responsive to. This account, the Reasonable 
Expectations Account, can accommodate neuroatypical agents who act on bad advice, while 
agreeing with De Re Significance accounts on cases involving neurotypical agents that they 
get right. Crucially, the Reasonable Expectations Account acknowledges a wider range of 
considerations that determine blameworthiness, not only normative moral reasons de re. In 
short:  
Reasonable Expectations Claim: Moral appraisal is determined entirely by 
whether the agent is responsive to the normative moral reasons that it is 
reasonable to expect her to be responsive to.   
The idea that blameworthiness is determined by what it is reasonable to expect of the agent 
is by no means new, and there are different ways of understanding this notion23.  
For example, Rosen (2002, 2004) holds that blameworthiness depends on whether, in moral 
deliberation, the agent has managed her beliefs as it is reasonable to expect her to. He takes 
this to be cashed out in procedural obligations on belief formation. Namely, to take steps to 
“inform [one]sel[f] about matters relevant to the moral permissibility of [one’s] conduct”, 
and to “reflect” to the degree deemed appropriate by the situation (2002, 63-5), where more 
reflection is demanded in response to “serious criticism”, “known diversity of opinion”, or 
“perceived tension in one’s moral view” (2002, 65). In Rosen’s view, provided an agent has 
met these obligations, and does not believe that her actions are wrong, it is not reasonable to 
 
23 For example, see Rosen (2002), Guerrero (2007), FitzPatrick (2008), and Sher (2009), who all focus 
on epistemic aspects: how much it is reasonable to expect an agent to notice about her situation, how 
reflective it’s reasonable to expect an agent to be about her beliefs, to what extent it’s reasonable to 
expect her to revise them, and how much effort it is reasonable to expect her to put in to employing 
appropriate strategies for evidence gathering. See also (Kelly 2016), who considers to what extent it 




expect her to avoid those actions (even if they are wrong)24. As others have pointed out, one 
implication of this is that agents can meet these conditions while holding moral beliefs that 
lead directly to wrongdoing. Ancient slaveowners25, cold-hearted capitalists26, and 1950s 
sexists27 are standard examples. Given the social circles they move in, situations are possible 
in which these agents reflect as much as the situation demands and nevertheless reach the 
conclusion that some bad action is permissible. Rosen’s view is that these agents meet the 
procedural obligations on belief formation, and so are not blameworthy for the resulting bad 
actions.   
Some have thought Rosen’s view of what it is reasonable to expect too lenient. For example, 
Fitzpatrick (2008) argues that it is reasonable to expect agents to revise their beliefs, even if 
those beliefs are commonplace within their social circles. Fitzpatrick takes this 
blameworthiness to be explained by its manifesting the vice of failing to subject one’s beliefs 
to sufficient critical scrutiny28. The Reasonable Expectations Account agrees with Fitzpatrick 
on this point, but has no need to appeal to vices. Rather, there are often good reasons to revise 
beliefs, and it is reasonable to expect agents to recognise and respond appropriately to them. 
For example, agents deliberating today need only consider the status of historical moral 
beliefs about slavery or the rights of women to realise that what one’s society thinks about 
moral permissibility is often not a good guide to what is true about moral permissibility29. 
This should tell us that merely relying on the commonplace beliefs of one’s society does not 
 
24 Zimmerman (1997, 2014) and Levy (2003, 2009) agree. 
25 See Donagan (1977), Slote (1982), Rosen (2002). 
26 See Fitzpatrick (2008). 
27 See Rosen (2002, 66-69). 
28 Relatedly, some have thought that the key notion is whether the agent had a fair opportunity to 
avoid wrongdoing, which we might understand as a kind of reasonable expectation (Wallace 1994; 
Watson 2004; Brink and Nelkin 2013; Nelkin 2016) 
29 For example, see Anderson’s discussions of historical philosophical defences of slavery, many of 
these written by some of the most well-educated people of the day (Anderson 2014, 2015, 2016). The 
moral domain is not the only domain that is like this. It strikes many people as obvious that under 
certain descriptions a conjunction is more likely than a single event (see Tversky & Kahneman (1974)), 




count as adequate moral reflection – it is reasonable to expect more scrutiny30. 
Acknowledging this means disagreeing with De Re Significance accounts, since it implies 
that not only moral reasons de re are significant. Information about what the right thing de 
dicto is likely to be, and how the agent responds to that information, is also significant.  
So, in general it is reasonable to expect agents to be responsive to various morally important 
aspects of their situations, including information about what is morally right de dicto, and not 
only what is morally important de re. Additionally, what it is reasonable to expect of any 
particular agent is affected by various factors. For example, her capacities. Uncontroversially, 
if S completely lacks the capacity to do X, then it is unreasonable to expect S to do X. 
However, there is some leeway in how limited S’s capacity to do X must be before it becomes 
unreasonable to expect her to do X. Philosophers have also disagreed over which capacities 
are relevant to determining what it is reasonable to expect. Sher (2009) holds that physical, 
but not mental, capacities are relevant. Sher borrows this demarcation from the legal 
reasonable person test for negligence. However, while orthodoxy in legal philosophy has 
generally been reluctant to take an agent’s mental capacities into consideration when 
attributing legal culpability31, this seems a puzzling import into a theory of moral 
blameworthiness. In so far as we are interested in the agent’s genuine capacity to respond to 
reasons, mental capacities are of obvious relevance to this (as the cases involving 
neuroatypical agents show). The Reasonable Expectations Account departs from Sher’s, and 
considers the agent’s mental capacities relevant in determining what it is reasonable for the 
agent to recognise. With this in mind, one might whether and how more everyday 
neurotypical psychological features affect an agent’s mental capacity, and therefore what it 
is reasonable to expect. The short, though perhaps unsatisfying, answer is that it depends. 
Forgetfulness, for example, may make it more difficult to respond appropriately – but we 
 
30 This also constitutes disagreement with the notion of legal reasonableness that understands all 
commonplace beliefs as ‘reasonable’ – where this might include unjustified racist or sexist beliefs (see 
Moran (2010), Baron (2011)). 
31 For example, see Vaughan vs. Menhove, in which it was deemed impermissible to take into account 




need more detail to determine this precisely. Forgetful agents will in most cases have 
strategies available to help them remember morally important things, and it is reasonable to 
expect them to use these strategies. Dispositions towards laziness or unreflectivity might 
impact mental capacity, but again, it depends on the details. Such dispositions could not form 
the basis for an excuse unless they significantly impacted the agent’s capacity to respond to 
all the moral reasons available to her (where this includes moral reasons de dicto as well as 
de re), such features could be an excuse32.  
Another relevant factor is the moral or practical stakes. As Guerrero argues, “[t]he more 
morally significant the actions that a belief in p […] will support or license, the more stringent 
the epistemic demands that must be met” (2007, 69). So, it is reasonable to expect agents to 
be more careful in forming their beliefs if something important depends on it. The Reasonable 
Expectations Account agrees with this general point but given its focus on the reasons that it 
is reasonable to expect agents to recognise, this expectation to take greater care applies not 
only when the stakes are actually high, but also when the agent has reasons to think they are 
high.  
By focussing on what it is reasonable to expect, rather than whether the agent is responsive 
to normative moral reasons de re, the Reasonable Expectations Account can say the right 
thing about the cases discussed in Sections 2 and 4. When the agent’s capacity to be 
responsive to the normative moral reasons de re is impaired, we need not evaluate them as 
blameworthy, even if they do the wrong thing. This is because there are usually other aspects 
of the situation that it is reasonable to expect them to be responsive to. For example, Mike 
lacks the capacity to respond to moral reasons involving other people’s feelings, but faces no 
barrier to appreciating the de dicto reason ‘that X is the morally right thing to do’. 
Additionally, the Reasonable Expectations Account can agree with De Re Significance 
accounts that responding to normative moral reasons de re is often praiseworthy, and failure 
to do so is often blameworthy. For example, Huck Finn is often used by proponents of De Re 
 




Significance accounts as an example of someone who is praiseworthy in virtue of doing the 
right thing in response to the normative moral reasons de re, in spite of his mistaken belief 
that he is acting wrongly in doing so. Proponents of De Re Significance accounts have 
appealed to this case to argue that responsiveness to normative moral reasons de re is all that 
matters for moral appraisal, and the agent’s epistemic situation does not matter33. However, 
we can agree that Huck is praiseworthy without taking this to imply that it is only 
responsiveness to normative moral reasons de re that matters. We should also note that Huck 
has ordinary capacities to recognize and respond to moral considerations, although given the 
society he lives in, it is unreasonable to expect him to know that he is doing the right thing34. 
So, the Reasonable Expectations Account can agree that he is praiseworthy for managing, 
against the odds, to do the right thing for the right reasons, while also acknowledging that 
were Huck to not free Jim, his misguided moral beliefs may constitute an excuse35, 36. 
It is less clear that the accounts can agree on how to evaluate agents like Bonnie.  By 
stipulation, she has no capacity to appreciate the significance of moral reasons. The 
Reasonable Expectations Account says that Bonnie’s lack of capacity to appreciate the 
normative importance of moral reasons makes it unreasonable to expect her to be responsive 
to them, and so not blameworthy if this results in wrongdoing. De Re Significance accounts 
cannot agree with this result. However, it is worth pointing out that this does not imply that 
Bonnie will be excused every time she does wrong – only in cases where the wrongdoing is 
 
33 See Arpaly (2002b). 
34 One might think that, in fact, Huck should be expected to do what he believes is right, and not free 
the slave. However, this reading of the case assumes that one’s moral beliefs should always override 
one’s responsiveness to other moral reasons such as the humanity of others. The Reasonable 
Expectations Account does not assume this.   
35 See Arpaly (2002b). For more on the possibility and rationality of akratic action, see (Weatherson 
2019; Davidson 2001, 2004; Arpaly 2002a). 
36 This is connected to the point, made by Sliwa (2016), that Huck’s praiseworthiness has perhaps 
been over-emphasised in the literature. Although Huck is praiseworthy, he is not maximally so. Had 





due to her lack of capacity37. Many cases will not be like this. For example, when Bonnie fails 
to offer the taxi to the pregnant woman, this is explained by her inability to appreciate the 
normative force of moral reasons, because in this case she has no other information available 
that would indicate that this might be a wrong thing to do. The case is subtle – there are no 
laws governing it, and novel – we assume Bonnie has no prior experience to draw on.  
Had Bonnie done something less subtle, like murder, the Reasonable Expectations Account 
would not necessarily imply she is excused. This is because in Murder, there are reasons that 
it is reasonable to expect Bonnie to appreciate against murdering. We can assume that she 
knows that there are conventional norms against murder – most legal systems prohibit it, 
and most people think that one morally ought not murder. Of course, Bonnie thinks this is 
all mistaken. However, we should expect her confidence about this to be similar to most 
ordinary people’s confidence in their own moral beliefs. Few people are completely certain 
about their own moral beliefs, and those who are rarely have good reason to be certain38. So, 
we should expect Bonnie, just like anyone else, to have some credence in the possibility that 
she is wrong about the permissibility of murder. If she does, then she also knows that by 
murdering, she would be taking a risk. If she is wrong, then committing murder would be 
very wrong. Furthermore, if she is right, and murder is permissible, then what she stands to 
gain is relatively trivial – she merely alleviates the mild boredom of the wait for the taxi. 
Bonnie does not need the capacity to appreciate the normative force of moral considerations 
to realize that this is not a risk worth taking. She only needs to appreciate that it might turn 
out that she is mistaken about how important it is to avoid morally wrong actions. These 
considerations concern what is morally important de dicto, rather than de re. Unlike De Re 
Significance accounts, the Reasonable Expectations Account is able to consider 
responsiveness to this kind of information as relevant to moral appraisal. This is particularly 
useful in cases like Bonnie’s where agents are unable to respond to normative moral reasons 
 
37 Nor does it imply that evil is in general its own excuse – most ordinary wrongdoers do not lack the 
capacity to respond to moral reasons.  




de re. While De Re Significance accounts are forced to evaluate agents like Bonnie as either 
beyond moral evaluation, or blameworthy by default, the Reasonable Expectations Account 
can give a more nuanced and satisfying account of whether agents like Bonnie are 
blameworthy. By including normative reasons de dicto among what it is reasonable to expect 
agents to recognise, the Reasonable Expectations Account can say that agents like Bonnie are 
sometimes, but not always, blameworthy.  
6. Summary 
I argued that De Re Significance accounts face problems when appraising neuroatypical 
agents, because of their focus on the moral significance of a particular kind of moral reason, 
normative moral reasons de re. Consideration of neuroatypical agents revealed possible cases 
of agents who are unresponsive to the normative moral reasons de re of their situation, but 
for whom this unresponsiveness does not imply deficient quality of will. After exploring the 
options available to De Re Significance accounts for accommodating such cases and 
highlighting their weaknesses, I offered the Reasonable Expectations Account as a better way 
to accommodate these cases while nevertheless agreeing with De Re Significance accounts 
about the cases they get right.  
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